[HECnet] RSTS/E started emitting "?EVTLOG (BLDNIC) -- %Integer error" messages

It's not uncommon or it least it didn't used to be.? Here are three examples: First, I believe early versions of Smalltalk did exactly this. Second, at WPI, we implemented two commands called freeze and thaw, which would take all the information in the currently running job (AC's, PC, open files, Etc.) and write them into a file.? You could ^C, freeze, come back later, thaw the .ICE file (frozen job, get it?) and be right where you were.? One common use was when a dial up was abruptly disconnected by call waiting.? The monitor would notice you were detached and perform a freeze on your behalf, thus both freeing up the job slot and not losing your work.? Saved me a bunch of TECO'ing.? It could have been extended to batch jobs running out of processor time, but I don't remember if it was. I liked it so much that I tried to implement it at Columbia for Tops-20.? Tried...? I think the problem I ran into was that I couldn't find out timers and get the same fork handles.? Or one of the problems.? Another was security, which I'll discuss below. Third, at Columbia, it was used extensively in our chronically CPU starved environment: * The EXEC could save the PCL environment (but I think this originally was part of the CMU implementation) * The mailing system keeps a binary file of forwarding bindings.? If you edit the text source, the newer write date is noticed and the binary is 'recompiled' * I lifted the feature for LPTSPL's LPFORM.INI parser when I realized how often it was getting reparsed (basically after any idle period between jobs) From the information security standpoint, you have to consider the usage of these kinds of files.? Obviously, you wouldn't want to thaw something with JACCT set unless the existing job had the ability to get that, was [1,2] without some fairly careful checking.? Ditto Tops-20, if the fork had capabilities.? I mean, if somebody could get write access to the binary, then they could potentially compromise system security with a little strategic FILDDT'ing (or EXAMINE and DEPOSIT, if it came to that). A 'legitimately' corrupt binary could also crash the fork on start up, but I don't recall as we ever fully addressed that.? I think a checksum would have been the obvious start, but I guess we didn't want to spend the cycles. In these days of multi-gigahertz processors, I don't see the children discussing it much at all.