108.31.82.9/QCOCAL - HECnet

20 Jun 2016

Johnny Billquist <bqt at softjar.se> writes:

...
 On 2016-06-20 18:19, Brian Schenkenberger, VAXman-
wrote:
    ___     _     _  _  __   __    _     _      _ 
_   ___   _____
  / __|   /_\   | \| | \ \ / /   /_\   | |    | \| | | __| |_   _|
  \__ \  / _ \  | .` |  \ V /   / _ \  | |__  | .` | | _|    | |
  |___/ /_/_\_\_|_|\_|   |_|   /_/ \_\ |____| |_|\_| |___|_  |_|

 You've allowed this node on HECnet, so I assume somebody on this list knows
 who runs it. 
Who runs it can always easily be found by http://mim.update.uu.se/nodedb

   Please have it secured!  It has been used in the
past several
 days to try and break into my system(s).  It is highly irresponsible to put
 access credentials into its SYS$ANNOUNCE allowing ANYBODY access to DCL and
 other utilities that can affect systems on the internet.  A reasonable way
 to allow access would be to have a guest account (restricted/captive) that
 can be used to create other login accounts.  Validate such accounts with a
 valid email address and other schemes that will insure that whomever is on
 this system can be vetted in some fashion.

 THANK YOU! 
I'm curious about what kind of intrusions we're talking about, and over 
which network.

In general, I want to keep HECnet more open than what you are suggesting 
above, but this also requires that people act responsibly. If there is 
abuse, I'd like to know. 
Well, since I have not yet put any of my systems on HECnet, it should have 
been obvious that it's via the internet.

-- 
VAXman- A Bored Certified VMS Kernel Mode Hacker    VAXman(at)TMESIS(dot)ORG

I speak to machines with the voice of humanity.